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ABSTRACT
 
Due to the recent increase in the 
severity and frequency of natural 
catastrophes, insurers believe that insured 
losses from such catastrophes can exceed $50 
billion. There is not enough capital 
available in the insurance industry to cover 
such catastrophic losses. Therefore, insurers 
have begun looking for new sources of capital. 
The most promising solution is in the capital 
market, specifically in catastrophe insurance 
options. The options have a settlement index, 
which is the market's estimate of the losses 
for the covered quarter. While these options 
have advantages as well as disadvantages over 
reinsurance. The main problem hindering the 
market is the lack of a generally accepted 
pricing model. Neither option pricing models 
nor reinsurance pricing methods are suitable 
for the severity of recent catastrophes. 
Since a pricing model would probably 
dramatically increase the popularity of 
catastrophe insurance options, the search for 
such a model is the source of great discussion 
in the insurance industry. 
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DEFINING THE PROBLEM 
Until 1989, there had never been a natural catastrophe that had 
cost the insurance industry more than $1 billion. Since 1989, 
there have been six (Mooney 35). Events such as these have had a 
dramatic effect on how insurers view their possible losses. Due 
to the increasing severity, as well as the unusually high 
frequency, of catastrophes over the last decade, insurers have 
come to the realization that losses resulting from a catastrophe 
have the potential to be much higher than originally estimated. 
In fact, insurers now believe that losses can easily exceed $50 
billion. This realization creates numerous problems in an 
industry that was developed with the belief that such a 
catastrophe would not cost more than $1 billion. 
Once insurers came to the conclusion that catastrophes could 
cost much more than originally believed, they immediately wanted 
to cover their increased exposure. First, they looked toward 
reinsurance companies for help in this area, since insurers 
ordinarily decrease their exposure with this traditional hedge. 
However, at the same time reinsurers came to the same conclusions 
as primary insurers and were afraid to offer too much coverage. 
As basic economic theory would predict, an increase in the demand 
and a decrease in the supply for catastrophe reinsurance has led 
to an increase in its price. A study conducted by the Reinsurance 
Association of America, or RAA, found that premiums increased from 
$11.3 billion to $12.8 billion, or 13.3%, during the first nine 
months of 1995. Furthermore, reinsurance premiums are growing at a 
faster rate than primary insurance premiums, which increased only 
3.6% in the first nine months of 1995 (Gastel 2). 
An extension of the problem is the shortage of capital in the 
reinsurance market. Most large insurance companies are able to 
obtain only $300-400 million In catastrophe reinsurance coverage 
(Gastel1). There have been six catastrophes costing over $1 
billion since 1989, including Hurricane Andrew and the Northridge 
earthquake, costing $15.5 billion and $12.5 billion, respectively 
(Mooney 35). In light of these figures, $300-400 million of 
reinsurance seems grossly inadequate. For example, insurers who 
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have a 1% share of a $50 billion catastrophe will suffer a $500 
million loss. This is over the $400 million limit of available 
catastrophe reinsurance coverage. In other words, even insurers 
with a share as low as 1% cannot "layoff" their exposure in the 
reinsurance market (36). As a result, primary insurers are 
restricted in the amount of coverage they are able to write. 
Hence, there is insufficient capital available in today's 
reinsurance market to cover catastrophe losses in excess of $50 
billion. 
This paper will investigate a number of solutions to the 
capital shortage problem. Catastrophe insurance options are the 
most promising solution and I will therefore focus on them for a 
more in-depth analysis. While these options are very similar to 
reinsurance, there are differences, many of which are beneficial. 
However, there are problems, the most prominent being the lack of 
a pricing model. Catastrophe options trading is currently slow 
because of these disadvantages. Fortunately, most of the problems 
that are hindering catastrophe options are solvable. In fact, 
with a generally accepted pricing model, catastrophe options could 
be a very successful addition to the insurance industry. 
POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS 
"Act of God" Bonds 
As the magnitude of catastrophe losses was brought to light, 
insurers began searching for new sources of capital and as a 
result, a number of solutions have been suggested. One new idea 
is "Act of God" bonds. These bonds are designed so that a "major 
disaster triggers some chill1ge in the underlying agreement" (Gastel 
2). These bonds are issued by insurers and if a catastrophe 
occurs, they do not pay all or part of the principal (Ceniceros 
41). If a catastrophe does not occur, the bond holder receives 
the principal at the maturity date of the bond. One can think of 
it as receiving the claim payment in advance, with the stipulation 
that if a catastrophe does not occur, the claim payment is 
returned with interest. In exchange for this loan, the insurer 
pays a higher than normal interest rate to the bond holder. 
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Catastrophe Risk Exchange 
Another new innovation is called CATEX, or Catastrophe Risk 
Exchange. It was developed by former New Jersey insurance 
commissioner Samuel Fortunato. Subscribers to the system are able 
to trade "units" of risk, equivalent in dollar value, in order to 
reduce their concentration of risk. CATEX uses a set of 
benchmarks to measure relative values for different perils and 
geographic locations, and prices are determined by the actual 
relative loss experience between traded units of exposure (Koegel 
49). To illustrate, a company could trade units of Florida 
windstorm for equivalent units of California earthquake (Gastel 
3). This electronic trading system is an ideal method for small, 
local insurers to diversify their business. CATEX has the 
potential to develop other innovations as well. For instance, 
there has already been interest expressed in the financial 
community to use actual transaction prices as an index for 
secondary-market derivatives trading outside CATEX. Over-the­
counter insurance derivatives trading by insurers has also been 
suggested. This would cut off the peaks of exposure of the 
primary company (49). 
Surplus Note Transactions 
In February of 1995, Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company 
pioneered yet another alternative to traditional reinsurance. In 
an agreement with Morgan Guaranty Trust Company of New York, 
Nationwide set up a trust fund which issued 30-year bonds to 
institutional investors. The $400 million proceedp were then 
invested in US Treasury securities, which served as collateral for 
the bonds. If at any time in the next ten years, Nationwide needs 
more financing, it can issue up to $400 million in surplus notes. 
These notes can then be substituted for the US Treasury notes 
which would allow Nationwide to pay its disaster claims. Under the 
"no utilization" option, the cost to Nationwide is the difference 
between the US Treasury security rate and the borrowing rate. If 
a catastrophe were to occur, the cost would increase (Koegel 46). 
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However, since the surplus notes are equity and not debt, this 
would not reduce Nationwide's statutory surplus which means 
Nationwide could write additional business (Gastel 2). Unlike 
reinsurance, this coverage has no trigger. Nationwide can access 
the funds at any time within the ten years, regardless of whether 
or not a catastrophe occurs. This deal also differs from 
reinsurance in that the note holder assumes the risk that the 
issuing insurer could default on repayment after a catastrophe. 
In the reinsurance industry, on the other hand, the reinsurer 
assumes timing and underwriting risks (Koegel 46). 
While "Act of God" bonds, CATEX, and surplus note 
transactions are all viable solutions to the shortage of capital, 
none seem to be attracting much interest from insurers. Luckily, 
the Chicago Board of Trade offers yet another alternative, and 
this once shows a great deal of promise. That potential solution 
is catastrophe insurance futures and options. 
Futures 
The capital market is a natural place to look for large 
amounts of coverage since United States private financial capital 
totals over $13 trillion (Mooney 36). This is 100 times the $130 
billion in capital that is available in the entire insurance 
industry (Ray 74). 
The Chicago Board of Trade first introduced catastrophe 
futures on December 11, 1992. They represent hail, riot, flood, 
earthquake, or wind loss experience and are available for four 
geographical regions: Eastern, Midwest, Western, and National. 
Insurers simply choose the contract which most accurately matches 
their book of business (McCullough 32). The period covered by the 
contract is called the loss quarter and these end in March, June, 
September, and December. Brokerage fees are typically between $15 
and $30 per contract. Settlement prices of the contracts are 
determined by an index prepared by the Insurance Services Office, 
or the ISO, and are based on the loss reports of a national pool 
of catastrophe policies (Ray 76). The index is comprised of at 
least ten of the 100 largest insurance companies that report to 
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the ISO and they are chosen based on their size and diversity 
(McCullough 32). To calculate the index, the ISO determines the 
loss ratio, which is incurred losses divided by earned premium, 
and then multiplies by $25,000, which is the face value of all 
contracts. The ISO then multiplies this figure by an estimated 
ratio of reported losses to incurred losses in order to account 
for reporting lags. The resulting index is essentially the 
market's expectations of a quarter's losses and premiums. If loss 
expectations rise, future contract prices rise accordingly. There 
is a three month reporting period, called a loss development 
period or run-off quarter, after the end of the quarter, plus an 
additional three months to collect and analyze the reports. Thus, 
the final settlement of a contract actually occurs seven months 
after the covered quarter (McLeod 34). For instance a June 
contract, which covers the second quarter, would not be settled 
until January. 
CATASTROPHE INSURANCE OPTIONS 
unfortunately, since their introduction pure futures 
contracts have not done well. In fact, trading has been so poor 
that Business Insurance reporter, Michael Schachner, has described 
their activity as "dormant" ("CBOT CAT Instruments ... " 69). 
Instead, there has been a shift from complete risk transfer 
through futures to insuring layers of risk with catastrophe 
insurance options, or CAT options (Lane and Lobo, A Simple 
Approach 1). A catastrophe spread option is a bullish vertical 
spread, which is defined as the buying one call option and writing 
another with a larger exercise price but the' same expiration date. 
It is called bullish because investors profit from a rise in the 
underlying asset, vertical because it has two different exercise 
prices, and a spread because it is made up of two options (Wilmott 
38). These options are essentially "insurance without the 
principle of indemnity" (Lane and Finn 2). In order to prevent 
fraud, an insured is normally required to have an insurable 
interest in the covered property. This means that the insured 
must lose something if the insured property is ruined. Therefore, 
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people cannot buy a policy to cover something they do not care 
about, and then destroy it in order to receive the insurance 
money. 
Options are similar to futures, with the exception that the 
owner has the right, but not the obligation, to settle at a 
specific price within a specific period of time. Therefore if the 
ISO ratio exceeds the option strike price, insurers would exercise 
their options. The value of the option is the difference between 
the index value and the strike price. Thus, if a catastrophe 
occurred, the index value would increase and that difference would 
help offset losses. On the other hand, if a catastrophe does not 
occur, the strike price is not reached, and the seller keeps the 
fee paid by the insurer. These scenarios are equivalent to an 
insurer buying reinsurance and then filing a claim versus an 
insurer purchasing reinsurance, filing no claims and losing the 
premium. Call options are similar to reinsurance in that layers 
of coverage can be obtained. These layers, or call spreads, are 
accomplished by purchasing a call option at one price while 
selling a call option at another price. The lower strike price is 
equivalent to the ceding company's retention, which is essentially 
a deductible for insurance companies. For instance, a company may 
buy a call option with a 50% loss ratio and sell a call option 
with a 75% loss ratio. This effectively allows the buyer to hedge 
against a loss ratio within a certain range, in this case between 
50% and 75%. 
In 1995, in an effort to improve their product, the Chicago 
Board of Trade announced that catastrophe options would be based 
on loss estimates provided by the Property Claims Service, or PCS. 
Following a catastrophe, PCS uses three techniques to arrive at 
their loss estimates. First, PCS conducts a general survey of 
insurers. This survey represents 70% of the market, based on 
premium-written market share. Second, PCS utilizes the National 
Insurance Risk Profile, or NIRP, which is an inventory of 
buildings and insured vehicles in over 3100 counties in the United 
States. An on-the-ground survey is the final technique utilized 
by PCS (CBOT, A User's Guide 11). The PCS index is the total 
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estimates of insured losses in the covered area during the 
appropriate period divided by 100 million (CBOT, The New 
Standardized Alternative 14). Thus, one point on the index is 
equivalent to $100 million of losses industry-wide. The indices 
represent nine different regions. They are National, Eastern, 
Northeastern, Southeastern, Midwestern, Western, and 3 state 
indices, Florida, Texas, and California. These three states are 
considered "catastrophe-prone", and therefore rece've their own 
index (2). The California and Western contracts have annual loss 
periods because their catastrophes are not seasonal, while the 
other seven regions have quarterly loss periods (4). Furthermore, 
insurers can purchase contracts with loss development periods of 
either six-months or twelve-months (5). 
Premiums are quoted in points and tenths of points, each 
point equaling $200 and each tenth of a point equaling $20 (16). 
Strike values are listed in multiples of five points (15). PCS 
also offers both "small cap" and "large cap" contracts. These 
caps limit the amount of aggregate industry losses that can be 
covered under a contract. A small cap contract covers losses from 
$0 to $20 billion while a large cap covers losses from $20 to $50 
billion (CBOT, A User's Guide 4). In other words, the small cap 
contract settles at the lesser of (a) $200 x the settlement value 
of the index or (b) $40,000 ($200 x 200 cap). A large cap 
contract covers losses from $20 to $50 billion and settles at the 
lesser of (a) $200 x settlement value of the index, with a lower 
bound of $40,000 or (b) $100,000 ($200 x 500 cap) (CBOT, The New 
Standardized Alternative 15,17). 
ADVANTAGES OF CATASTROPHE INSURANCE OPTIONS 
By utilizing catastrophe options, insurers can essentially 
freeze their loss ratios, spread their exposure, and increase 
capacity. These are obviously phenomenal advantages to insurers. 
But catastrophe options have even more to offer. First, the 
pricing index is straightforward, understandable, and easily 
accessible, particularly with the PCS index. In addition, In many 
ways CAT options offer more flexibility than reinsurance. First, 
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options allow insurers to get a lower retention level since they 
can buy coverage below the attachment point offered by the 
traditional reinsurance market (CBOT, The New Standardized 
Alternative 8). That is, insurers can obtain claim payments at 
lower loss levels. Second, if insurers decide they have too much, 
or not enough, coverage they can easily sell, or buy, more 
options. In contrast, reinsurance prices and conditions are 
locked in after lengthy and costly negotiations. This feature can 
also help alleviate the volatility of the insurance industry. By 
allowing easy entry and exit, capacity can rise and fall with the 
industry's needs, thus "smoothing out" the peaks and troughs of 
the insurance cycle ("USA... " 2). Third, insurers do not have to 
worry about their premium relative to the rest of the industry. 
Premiums of CBOT options are public and prices are the same for 
all option users (CBOT, The New Standardized Alternative 5). 
Fourth, reinsurers can diversify their business by selling 
catastrophe options in a region where there is normally no 
opportunity to write business (9). Fifth, insurers can use 
catastrophe options to avoid reinstatement fees. Often, a 
reinsurance contract will require such a fee after a catastrophe 
occurs in order to keep the contract in effect. In other words, a 
primary company must essentially buy a new contract, although at a 
cheaper price, for the remainder of the period. However, if a 
catastrophe occurs in September, an insurer could opt to purchase 
a December contract to cover the remaining quarter rather than 
paying a reinstatement fee (10). Furthermore, any new method for 
covering catastrophic losses will increase competition for 
reinsurers, which will lead to lower prices. Finally, and perhaps 
most importantly, PCS options are guaranteed by the Board of Trade 
Clearing Corporation, or BOTCC. The BOTCC is a separate entity 
from the exchange and it exists "to ensure the financial integrity 
of all futures and options contracts traded at U.S. futures 
exchanges" (CBOT, A User's Guide 60). Considering the BOTCC's 
large amount of capital, there is, in fact, less risk of default 
than there is with reinsurance. 
After considering the simplicity, flexibility, and 
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predictability of losses of catastrophe options, insurers may soon 
begin choosing this new path instead of reinsurance. Yet trading 
of catastrophe insurance options and futures on the Chicago Board 
of Trade has been slow. If these derivatives have so many 
positive characteristics that reinsurance does not, why are they 
trading poorly? Perhaps it is because despite their numerous 
advantages, catastrophe derivatives also carry some distinct 
disadvantages. These problems fall into into three categories: 
the risk associated with the options market, the newness of the 
market, and basis risk. 
DISADVANTAGES OF CATASTROPHE INSURANCE OPTIONS 
Risk Associated with the Market 
Many still consider the capital market to be a "crapshoot" 
(Ray 77). In other words, derivatives are high risk and 
speculative, particularly for the often conservative insurance 
industry. Derivatives are not the traditional way of doing 
business, are often viewed as "trendy", and have not proven 
themselves over the long term. This hesitancy is understandable 
considering the fact that many insurance companies "pride 
themselves on the simplicity and strength of their current 
condition" (McCullough 35 ) . 
The reputation of the capital market has caused a shortage of 
buyers and sellers. Outside investors have not yet attempted to 
play this new market. It was originally hoped that pension fund 
managers would enter the market as sellers. However it was soon 
discovered that such companies did not want to risk losing their 
customers' pension funds. Perhaps Michael Smith, an industry 
analyst with Lehman Bros. in New York, summed it up best when he 
said "What? Pension funds betting on the weather? It better not 
be mine or yours" (Schachner, "CBOT CAT Instruments ... " 72). This 
lack of investors also creates a liquidity problem. Since the 
CBOT wants contract prices to be based on the index rather than 
demand, it has placed a limit on the number of purchases, sales, 
or holdings that are allowed as long as the market is small. 
However, this means that large insurers cannot buy enough to hedge 
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properly and contracts cannot be bought or sold on short notice. 
Consequently, a catch-22 is created. Liquidity would improve if 
more companies participated in the market, but more companies will 
not participate until liquidity improves (McCullough 35). 
In order for any market to be successful it must have buyers 
and sellers. While buyers and sellers of catastrophe insurance 
options are scarce at the moment, there is a place for them in the 
market. Investors just need to open their eyes to the 
possibilities. The Chicago Board of Trade has identified three 
groups of potential buyers: large insurers, reinsurers, and small 
insurers (McCullough 31). Large insurers would utilize these 
options because they have a well diversified portfolio risk. 
Therefore, their losses are more likely to correlate with the 
index. They also have more historical data in order to compare 
their loss history with the index over several years (33). The 
same advantages are true for reinsurance companies. In contrast, 
small insurance companies would buy more regional contracts than 
national contracts. They would also have to look more closely at 
their historical data in order to see how their losses correlate 
with the index. However once this is determined, they should be 
able to decide which contracts are best for them (33). 
Next, the market needs sellers of catastrophe options. Bill 
Scott, Finance professor at the Katie Insurance School at Illinois 
State university said, "To play in this market you have to have 
deep pockets. Sellers can build up some pretty major capital over 
several years. But if something like Hurricane Andrew hits, you 
can meet God in a hurry" (Schachner, "CBOT Cat Instruments ... " 
71). Fortunately, there are potential investors who have deep 
enough pockets. 
Hedgers are one group of sellers who could utilize these new 
products. Since catastrophe options are uncorrelated with bond 
prices, investors could use the derivatives to diversify their 
portfolios (CBOT, The New Standardized Alternative 2). As an 
employee of Guy Carpenter said, "Insurance risk can be considered 
an asset class. And it's diversification for investors" 
(Schachner, "Protecting Against the Big One .•. " 5). Building 
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supply firms and construction companies could also benefit from 
selling catastrophe insurance options. Their profits after a 
catastrophe are inversely related to that of the insurance 
industry. Their demand increases due to repairing damaged 
buildings. Likewise, if insurers have low claims following a 
catastrophe, construction companies have a low demand. These 
players could add depth and liquidity to the market (McCullough 
33) • 
Others may want to enter the market as speculators. A study 
conducted by Lane Financial of Chicago found that speculators can 
make a profit by selling these derivatives. Tables IIa and lIb 
compare the relative premiums of catastrophe spreads to the 
relative premium of T-bond spreads using prices for the 1994 
September Eastern contract. 
TABLE Ua: Relativ Premium of 40/60 CAT Option vs. T-bond 
(A) (B) Prob. Prob. (C) (C) 
Lower Upper Above Above Black Relative 
Futures Strike Strike Lower Upper Market Model Premium 
Position Price Price Price Volatility Leg Leg Premium Premium IC/(B-A)I 
CAT 40 60 13.64% 9.09% 6.5 32.5% 
option 
T-Bond 118 J24 125.37 9.41% 13.64% 9.09% 0.1531 11.15% 
TABLE lIb: Relative Premium of 100/120 CAT Option vs. T-bond 
(A) (B) Prob. Prob. (C) (C) 
Lower Upper Above Above Black R lative 
Futures Strike Strike Lower Upper Market Model Premium 
Position Price Price Price Volatility Leg Leg Premium Premium IC/(B-A)] 
CAT 
option 
100 120 6.82% 4.55% 3.5 17.5% 
T-Bond 118 126 127.14 9.11 % 6.82% 4.55%. 0.0634 5.57% 
(Lane and Lobo, More Premium 2-3) 
Lane Financial chose the strike prices of the spread so that 
the probability of the lower strike of the bond option finishing 
in-the-money is the same as the probability of the lower leg of 
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the CAT spread finishing in-the-money. Similarly, the probability 
of the upper leg of the bond option finishing in-the-money and the 
upper leg of the CAT option finishing in-the-money are equal (Lane 
and Lobo, More Premium/Less Risk 1). The catastrophe insurance 
probabilities are based on histograms from simulated settlement 
values for the September Eastern Catastrophe index using a 10% 
constant growth rate while probabilities for the T-bond were 
computed using the Black futures option model (1). Technically, 
when the risk of these two options are equal, their relative 
premiums should be equal as well. However, the relative premium 
for both the 40/60 and the 100/120 CAT spreads are approximately 
three times that of the bond call spread. In other words, 
catastrophe spreads offer much more premium for the same amount of 
risk. This suggests that catastrophe spreads may be overpriced. 
Or "perhaps the market is pricing in features that are presently 
unknown" (2). No matter what the reason, it is definitely an 
incentive for sellers to enter the market. 
Thus, insurance catastrophe options are desirable for 
speculators as well as hedgers. When these sellers are added to 
the three groups of buyers suggested by the CBOT, large insurers, 
small insurers, and reinsurers, a market for these options becomes 
a very real possibility. 
A New Market 
The second category of problems arise from the fact that the 
market is still very young. While the Chicago Board of Trade is 
finding ways to improve upon the product every day, CAT options 
were introduced just four years ago, in December of 1992. 
Regulation, which differs from state to state, is a prime 
example of a problem resulting from the newness of catastrophe 
options. For instance, California's insurance code requires that 
"the insurer's relevant underwriting experience or insurance­
related risk exposure bear a correlation to the risk exposures of 
the index underlying the insurance ••. options thereon entered into 
as part of the hedging transaction" (Koegel 48). If that 
correlation ceases to exist, the contract will be terminated as 
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soon as possible (48). Illinois was the first state to address 
regulatory standards for catastrophe derivatives (McCullough 34). 
Here it was decided that insurance derivatives would be allowed 
but they must be treated as investments rather than reinsurance 
(Koegel 48). Many states, following Illinois' lead, have 
investment-basket clauses. In order to prevent the profitability 
of insurers from being dependent upon the outcome of their 
investments, they are prohibited from having "baskets of 
investments" (McCullough 34). This means that regulators have 
placed limits on the amount of investments insurers can hold and 
on the riskiness of those investments. Consequently, the amount 
of coverage insurers are able to obtain through the capital market 
is usually significantly lower than the amount needed for an 
effective hedge (31). Within the area of regulation, accounting 
procedures are a concern. Currently, there are no standards for 
accounting procedures for catastrophe insurance derivatives. This 
is creating a sense of confusion about the market, which only 
serves to hamper its success even further (34). In order to be 
completely successful, catastrophe derivatives will need 
appropriate decisions from state regulators. Proper regulation 
could provide a favorable atmosphere and at the same time, assure 
the general public that options will not affect the stability of 
their insurance companies. Currently however, most regulatory 
bodies are not making any decisions. They are waiting to see how 
accurately catastrophe derivatives perform (McCullough 34). 
Another problem associated with the new options is that they 
are only available on the Chicago Board of Trade. The market has 
not had time to expand and is therefore geographically limited to 
the United States. This is obviously a problem for insurers with 
international catastrophe coverage. On the other hand, a study 
conducted by Swiss Reinsurance Company based on 1992 data found 
that at $30.6 billion in premiums, the United States is the 
largest supplier of reinsurance among top nations. The study also 
concluded that the United States has the highest demand for 
reinsurance. In fact, insurers here pay $43.3 billion in premiums 
for business ceded and retrocessions, which is reinsurance for 
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reinsurers. That translates to 28.9% of the world-wide non-life 
reinsurance premiums (Gastel 1). In other words, although options 
are limited to the United States, a significant portion of the 
world-wide market is able to utilize this hedging technique. 
Furthermore, the market could eventually expand internationally. 
Basis Risk 
Basis risks, which are "risks arising from differences 
between the way the property/casualty insurance market works and 
the way the [Chicago Board of Trade] ...market works" (McLeod 35). 
An example of a basis risk is the limited reporting period. The 
settlement date of a contract allows only a three month reporting 
period after the covered quarter. Thus, if there is a significant 
amount of incurred-but-not-reported losses, or IBNR, the 
settlement price of a contract will not accurately reflect losses. 
Therefore, hedging with derivatives is unsuitable for long-tail 
lines, such as liability insurance. 
Basis risk is often a question of whether the indices are 
accurate assessments of losses. One way to measure the basis risk 
of CAT options is to study the "industry" trigger and then adjust 
for market share. For example, a $10 billion trigger and a 1% 
market share company in Florida translates to a $100 million 
attachment point, which is the point at which the insurance would 
be activated. Insurers can use historical data for these 
calculations and the resulting theoretical numbers can then be 
compared with actual damage. The closer these figures are, the 
more accurate the index and the lower the basis risk (Schauble 1). 
The ISO index was tested after the Northridge earthquake in 
Los Angeles. Northridge was the biggest catastrophe to occur 
since the CBOT listed catastrophe contracts, so the earthquake was 
a good test for the accuracy of the index (Lane 1). The 
earthquake was covered by the March, 1994 contract, and ISO's loss 
estimates as of March 31, 1994 were approximately $2.2 billion. 
At the same time, pes loss estimates were $4.5 billion and A.M. 
Best estimates were $5.3 billion (Lane 2). Obviously, ISO's 
figures were low. However, there are five possible explanations 
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for these differences. First, ISO does not try to estimate 
ultimate net loss, which is the object of A.M. Best's estimates. 
Second, none of ISO's sample companies are on A.M. Best's "under 
review" list. This removes companies that are writing more poorly 
than others from the index. Third, perils covered by the ISO 
index differ from those in A.M. Best's loss estimations. For 
instance, both sprinkler damage and fire following an earthquake 
are not considered ISO perils but are on A.M. Best's list of 
perils. Table I illustrates this idea further. 
TABLE I: Losses according to ISO 
CALIFORNIA ALL OTHER STATES 
4th Qtr 1st Qtr 4th Qtr 1st Qtr 
1993 1994 1993 1994 
LINES (FINAL) (INTERIM) (FINAL) (INTERIM) 
Allied Lines 2.0 2.3 12.1 22.4 
Commercial Auto PD 0.1 0.8 10.4 3.0 
Commercial Multi-Peril 1.8 259.1 14.7 23.5 
EARTHQUAKE 0.0 1833.5 0.0 1.0 
Farm 0.8 1.5 8.1 5.1 
Fire 0.2 0.4 1.3 1.5 
Homeowners/Mobile 18.6 18.6 77.4 164.0 
Inland Marine 2.8 101. 6 34.8 64.3 
Personal Auto PD 2.7 30.8 86.8 39.2 
TOTAL 29.1 2,248.6 247.7 324.2 
Premium Base 1,746.1 1,819.5 10,495.9 11,164.8 
Loss Ratio 1. 7% 129.6% 2.4% 2.9% 
(Lane 2) 
The table shows ISO's loss figures for the December 1993 
contract and the interim results for the March 1994 contract, 
which includes the Northridge earthquake. Losses are further 
divided into two groups, California and all other states. This 
table demonstrates that the Northridge Earthquake had substantial 
effect on only four lines of coverage: earthquake, commercial 
mUlti-peril, inland marine, and personal auto PD (physical 
damage). It is also interesting to note that winter storm damage 
did not affect ISO's loss estimates. This is because "freeze" and 
"flood" are also not included in the loss index (Lane 2). The 
fourth explanation is that the lack of IBNR losses in the ISO 
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index creates a significant difference in estimates. Finally, the 
ISO is concerned with pure loss while A.M. Best takes loss 
adjustment expenses into account. As mentioned earlier, the CBOT 
has attempted to improve upon some of these differences in PCS 
options. Like A.M. Best, PCS considers all perils and include 
IBNR. However, like ISO they are concerned with pure loss only 
(3). These flaws were exemplified in ISO's final loss ratio for 
the contract covered by the Northridge Earthquake. The March, 
1994 contract closed with a 105.8% loss ratio, or a $26,450 
settlement price per contract. Considering the catastrophe's 
final losses totaled $12.5 billion, these figures were extremely 
low (Lane 2). As Dena Karras, who is in charge of market 
development for the Chicago Board of Trade, says, "We're only as 
good as the industry reports we get ... If those are slow and 
underestimated, there isn't much we can do" (Schachner, "CBOT CAT 
Instruments ... " 71). Unfortunately, insurance companies can only 
hedge as well as their losses correlate with the index. 
Once again, there is a solution to the problem of basis 
risks. First, as the CBOT makes improvements to the index, basis 
risk will decrease. The PCS index is already one improvement over 
the ISO index. Second, reinsurance companies could fill in the 
gap by selling coverage for basis risks. For example, primary 
companies could purchase reinsurance for fire following an 
earthquake, which is a peril not covered by catastrophe options. 
Proponents of insurance catastrophe options remain optimistic 
because all of these problems are solvable. Prospective buyers 
and sellers simply need time to learn about the market and 
acclimate themselves to the new idea. Insurers have been buying 
reinsurance for a long time and it is not surprising that they 
need some convincing in order to leave that security. However, 
with a little education, investors' misconceptions could be 
corrected (McCullough 35). One suggestion for finding solutions 
to many of the CAT options obstacles is for the CBOT to interact 
with potential investors. This would encourage participation and 
perhaps even create other derivatives (35). Richard Sandor, 
chairman and chief executive officer of Center Trading Partners in 
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New York and a pioneer in the field of financial futures, believes 
that, "Like all things, it will take time and education. If you 
recall, 10 years ago we were using typewriters, not PCs" 
(Schachner, "CBOT CAT Instruments .•. " 70). 
PRICING 
The Problem 
The hottest topic related to catastrophe insurance options is 
their pricing. In fact, lack of a generally accepted pricing 
model is probably the main reason the market has not been more 
successful. Within the pricing debate, expected losses are 
obviously the major factor. Many methods of predicting losses are 
based on historical data and the assumption that loss trends of 
the past will continue into the future. However, due to the low 
frequency of catastrophes, historical data is often lacking (Lane 
and Finn 2). Hence, it seems beneficial to study a longer period 
of time in which case inflation becomes an important consideration 
(Cozzolino 3). On the other hand, the magnitude of catastrophe 
losses has increased over the years. Explanations for this 
include an increase in population density along coastal regions 
and increased construction costs. This suggests studying a more 
recent history (Lane and Lobo, A Simple Approach 2). Obviously, 
trying to predict the future by studying historical trends has 
numerous complications and involves making many assumptions. It 
is possible, however, to make an educated guess. Reinsurance 
companies do it every day. 
Reinsurance Pricing Methods 
Each reinsurance company uses its own pricing method and one 
could spend years trying to learn them all. Three common methods 
of pricing catastrophe reinsurance are Pareto, comparable cover, 
and experience rating. All three methods use past loss experience 
(Lane and Finn 2). The Pa eto distribution, which models the 
severity of catastrophes, is often used in conjunction with the 
Poisson distribution, which models frequency (Cozzolino 5). The 
Pareto distribution has a "fat-tail" and is therefore a good 
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estimate for extreme values of insured losses such as 
catastrophes. The Poisson distribution, or "the distribution of 
rare events," is well suited for measuring catastrophe frequency 
(5). Reinsurers use the Pareto and Poisson distributions to fit 
historical data and find the expected value of losses. This 
method results in consistent pricing, but does not consider 
factors such as the market's perception of catastrophe frequencies 
or changes in supply and demand of risk capital (Lane and Finn 2). 
Comparable cover consists of comparing a new reinsurance contract 
to another one that is slightly different. For instance, one 
contract may have more risk or less coverage. By making slight 
adjustments to the original, a price can be established for the 
new contract (Grandisson). Experience rating includes payback or 
rate-an-line (Lane and Finn 2). Rate-on-line, or ROL, is the 
ratio of premium to exposure. In other words, it is the premium 
divided by the upper limit of coverage. Payback is l/ROL. The 
resulting number tells reinsurers the minimum number of years they 
would have to receive payments from the primary company in order 
to pay for a loss of the policy limit, ignoring interest. This 
does not take into consideration investment income. For instance, 
a 5% ROL translates to a payback of 20. This means the reinsurer 
does not want a loss to occur more than once every 20 years. 
Otherwise, they will not have made enough money from the contract 
to pay for a claim and still make a profit (Grandisson). 
Many reinsurers also utilize modern technology to estimate 
future catastrophe losses. Computer programs are becoming the 
latest craze in today's reinsurance industry. One well-known 
program is called CATMAP. To use this program, a reinsurer enters 
data about the exposure being priced into the computer, such as 
the premium and the location. The computer then applies Monte 
Carlo simulations to 10,000 years worth of catastrophes. 
Sometimes it assumes the best case scenario, in which there are no 
losses, sometimes it assumes the worst case scenario, in which 
full coverage is needed, and sometimes it assumes scenarios in 
between. In the end, the program gives an average loss, which can 
then be used to price the contract (Grandisson). CATMAP is just 
21
 
one of many of these types of programs. Eurocat, for example, is 
another popular program and is designed for catastrophe coverage 
in Europe. Other programs are designed for specific types of 
catastrophes, such as windstorms or earthquakes. 
unfortunately, Pareto, comparable cover, experience rating, 
and computer programs are all based on historical data. Since 
catastrophe losses have only recently become exceedingly high, 
there is not enough historical data regarding losses in excess of 
$1 billion. ThUS, reinsurance pricing models are not a suitable 
solution for the pricing of catastrophe insurance options. 
Perhaps the solution lies in the pricing of options. 
Option Pricing 
The value of options consists of two factors, time value and 
intrinsic value. The time value is the difference between the 
option value before and at the expiration date, and is affected by 
the volatility of the underlying asset and the time to maturity. 
The higher the volatility and the more time to maturity, the 
greater the time value (CBOT, A User's Guide 18). Intrinsic value 
is the difference between the strike price and the stock price. 
An option has intrinsic value if it is in-the-money (18). 
In 1973 in "The Journal of Political Economy", Fischer Black 
and Myron Scholes published a model for the pricing of options 
that "rocked the financial world" (Lane and Finn 2). Their model 
has become commonly known as the Black-Scholes model. Most new 
ideas for the pricing of options, including computer programs are 
based on this formula. In the derivation of the Black-Scholes 
formula, seven assumptions are made. They are: 
1) Short-term interest rate 
through time. 
is known and is constant 
2) The asset price follows the lognormal random walk. The 
variance rate of the return on the stock is constant. 
3) The stock pays no dividends or other distributions. 
22 
4)	 The option can only be exercised at maturity. This is 
known as a European option. Catastrophe options are 
considered European options because they are not 
exercised until the settlement date. 
5)	 There are no transaction costs in buying or selling the 
stock or the option. 
6)	 It is possible to borrow any fraction of the price of a 
security to buy it or to hold it, at the short-term 
interest rate. 
7)	 Short selling is permitted (Black and Scholes 640). 
The Black-Scholes equation is
 
C(S,t) = S x N(dl) - (E)(e-rt ) x N(d2)
 
where
 
dl = logeS/E) + lr + 1/2o~litl
 
otl/2
 
d2 = loglS/E) + lr - 1/2o~litl
 
ot l/2
 
and
 
S = current value of the underlying asset 
E = exercise price 
t = time to expiration 
r = interest rate 
a =	 volatility 
(Wilmott 100). 
The equation states the value of a call option as the 
probability that the option will be exercised, N(d2), times the 
discounted exercise price subtracted from the current stock price 
multiplied by another probability factor, N(dl) (Nielsen 1). N(dl) 
is the factor by which the present value of an exercised call 
exceeds the current stock price (2). Both probability 
distributions are risk-adjusted and assume that the distribution 
of st,ock prices is lognormal (12). 
Lars Tyge Nielsen, an Associate Professor of Finance at 
INSEAD in France, explains the formula using a very simplified 
method. Notice that the payoff of the call option at maturity T is 
if ST ~ E 
otherwise 
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( 3 ) • 
The equation represents the fact that the value of the option 
will be the difference between the value of the stock and the 
price paid for the stock if the exercise price is less than the 
value of the stock. The payoff will be 0 if the exercise price is 
greater than the stock price. Assuming the option finishes in­
the-money, this value has two components. One is the payment of 
the exercise price. It is 
Cl	 = -E if ST ~ E 
o otherwise 
The second component is the value of the stock, defined as 
if ST ~ E 
otherwise 
( 4 ) • 
By finding the expected values of Cl and C2 separately, it is 
easier to find the value of the option. The current value of Cl is 
the exercise price, discounted at a riskless rate to the present 
value. Thus 
P{ST > E}, or the risk-adjusted probability that the option 
will finish in-the-money, is N(d2). Therefore, the present value 
of the exercise price is 
which is the second component of the Black-Scholes equation (4). 
The expected value of C2 is a conditional expectation. That 
is, it is the value of the option given that the option finishes 
in-the-money. In mathematical terms, this means 
[E(ST ST > E)] X P{ST > E} 
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Once again using a risk-adjusted probability for P, this lS 
equal to 
( e rt ) (S) x N(d1) 
Nielsen then multiplied by e-rt to discount to present value, 
which resulted in 
S x N(d1) 
( 6) • 
Placing the two components together, once again results in 
the Black-Scholes formula. 
C(S,t) = S x N(d1) - (E)(e-rt ) x N(d2) 
Under the given assumptions, any derivative security that is 
paid for up front and whose price depends only on'S' and 't' must 
satisfy the Black-Scholes equation (Wilmott 44). It would 
therefore seem that the formula would be perfect for those who 
wish to invest in catastrophe insurance options. However, some of 
the assumptions of the model are often incorrect. 
The first problem stems from assuming that the stock price is 
distributed lognormally. In reality, the stock market is not this 
predictable. Likewise, this assumption does not apply to the 
catastrophe options market since losses are not lognormally 
distributed. In addition, the Black-Scholes model overprices deep 
in-the-moneyoptions (Gibson 145). When a catastrophe strikes, a 
CAT option will most likely be deep in-the-money, since losses, 
and thus the index, will be very high. Therefore, the theoretical 
price of the options at this time would be too high. Another 
problem with the model has to do with the standard deviation, s, 
which measures the variability of the stock price over a certain 
periOd of time. Unfortunately, the assumption of constant 
volatility is not always correct. This can be shown by finding 
the implied volatility, which estimates volatility without the use 
of historical data (Lane and Finn 3). It is calculated by 
substituting r, S, E, t, and the market option price into the 
Black-Scholes formula and solving for o. The result represents 
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the market's estimation of volatility. If t, r, and S are fixed, 
the implied volatility should be constant. In reality, however, 
options that are deep in-the-money have a greater implied 
volatility than those at-the-money. The graph of this phenomena 
is called the "volatility smile." Depending on market conditions, 
the smile may be lopsided, or even a frown. Specifically, 
catastrophe options are more volatile at the end of the season 
(Lane and Finn 7). Furthermore, volatility is greatest during the 
loss period (CBOT, A User's Guide 20). In any event, volatility 
is not constant and there is a flaw in the Black-Scholes model 
(Wilmott 66). Mark Rubinstein, finance professor at the 
University of California at Berkeley, said "What people have 
observed is that when stock prices go up, volatility tends to go 
down. When stock prices go down, volatility goes up. Black­
Scholes assumes that does not happen" (Hemmerick 1). It is 
important to realize that historical volatility and implied 
volatility are only estimations. The correct volatility is the 
one which actually occurs. This is known as the realized 
volatility (Lane and Finn 3). 
The Insurance Value of Options 
While most people associate the value of options with their 
intrinsic values and their time values, many forget the feature 
that distinguishes an option from other financial assets, the 
insurance value. It is this component that insurance companies 
are utilizing in catastrophe options. Therefore it is beneficial 
to study it more closely by neutralizing the intrinsic and time 
values (Brenner 25). One method for doing this is to assume the 
present value of the strike price equals the current stock price. 
Then 
S = E x e-rt {I} 
where e-rt is the present value factor. Then 
e rtS x E {2} 
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The option is therefore considered to be at-the-money on a forward 
basis (26). {2} is substituted into the Black-Scholes equation 
for dl and d2, obtaining 
dl 0(t1/ 2 )(1/2) {3} 
-0 ( t 1 / 2) ( 1 12 ) {4} 
The cumulative normal density function can be written as: 
N(d) = 1/2 + (2n)-1/2(d-d3/6+dS/40 ... ). {5} 
using a first order approximation, which means dropping any terms 
that are of the third order or higher, and substituting equations 
{3} and {4} into equation {5}, we arrive at 
N(dl) = 1/2 + .2ot {6}
 
N(d2) 1/2 .2ot {7}
 
where 0t = O(t 1 / 2) is volatility. Next, equations {2}, {6}, and 
{7}, can be substituted into the Black-Scholes equation, obtaining 
{8}
 
(28). 
This result is the insurance value of the option. It can 
also be thought of as the insurance premium (25). Furthermore, 
the value of a put is 
{9} 
This is tabulated using the put-call parity, which says 
p C + (E)(e-rt ) - S {lO} 
Notice that the two values are equal. This is because puts and 
calls provide the same service, insurance, after the effects of 
intrinsic and time values are taken away (26). For instance, 
27
 
investors who want to sell short are hoping the price of the stock 
will decrease. In order to guard against the possibility of an 
increase in stock price, investors can buy a call option. Then if 
the price of the stock rises, the short sale will lose money, but 
the investor can exercise call option. This transaction will make 
a profit and help offset losses. Similarly, a put option can be 
bought to insure against a decrease in stock price. 
The best method of pricing catastrophe insurance options 
would combine the models for pricing options with models for 
pricing catastrophe reinsurance. While finding the right 
combination has proved to be a difficult and much debated subject, 
there are a number of viable solutions. 
Pricing Catastrophe Insurance Options 
In 1993, Morton Lane and Steve Lobo of Lane Financial 
published a simple suggestion to the problem of pricing 
catastrophe options. They began their procedure by developing 
synthetic histories from loss estimates from 1949 through 1992. 
Lane and Lobo obtained their loss estimates from the Property 
Claims Service and adjusted the data to a 1991 basis in five 
different ways. The first three methods assumed a 6%, 10%, and 
15% constant growth rate. In these cases, the formula is 
Adjusted Loss = eX(current year loss) 
where x = (assumed growth rate) x (1991 - current year) (Lane and 
Lobo, A Simple Approach 6). The fourth method adjusted current 
year losses assuming that the growth rate for a specific year is 
equal to the growth in the Consumer Price Index between that year 
and 1991 multiplied by the growth in the population between that 
year and 1991. The formula is 
Adjusted Loss = 
(current year loss) x (1 + %.6. CPIcurrent year to 1991) X 
(1 + %L). populationcurrent year to 1991). 
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The final method assumed that the growth rate lS equal to the 
growth in nominal GNP between a specific year and 1991. This 
formula is 
Adjusted Loss = 
(current year loss) x (1 + %tl GNPcurrent year to 1991) (6). 
Lane and Lobo then divided the adjusted losses by the 1991 premium 
(2). Attachment I shows the resulting loss ratios for the 
September Eastern Catastrophe. 
Next, Lane and Lobo created histograms and placed the results 
in bins, as shown in Attachment II. Obviously, this can be done 
for any of the five adjusted loss scenarios as well as any 
catastrophe spread and contract quarter. As an example, the 
results on Table III assume a 10% constant growth rate and the 
40/60 spread. 
TABLE III: Expected Value of the 40/60 CAT Spread 
Index Frequency Probability 40/60 CAT Expected 
Settle AI (Sum of A) = Settle Value 
CAl (Bl (C l = BxC 
<40 38 86.36% 0.0 0.00 
>40 & <50 1 2.27% 5.0 0.11 
>50 & <60 1 2.27% 15.0 0.34 
>60 4 9.09% 20.0 1. 82 
Total 44 Expected Value of 40/60 Spread 2.27 
(Lane and Lobo, A Simple Approach 2) 
Column A displays the frequencies from the information in 
Attachment II. The probability of a loss ratio being below 40, 
between 40 and 50, between 50 and 60, are given in column B. The 
settlement value of each scenario, which was the midpoint of the 
loss ratio bin, is given in column C. The expected value of the 
spread, which in this case is 2.27 (2). 
As mentioned earlier, historical data of catastrophes has 
changed over the years. Therefore, it may be more desirable to 
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apply the same method to more recent history. Table IV displays 
the results of such an application. 
TABLE IV: Expected Value of the 40/60 CAT Spread 
Index Frequency Probability 40/60 CAT Expected 
Settle AI (Sum of A);;:: Settle Value 
(A) (B) (C) BxC 
<40 8 80.00% 0.0 0 
>40 & <50 0 0.00% 5.0 0 
>50 & <60 0 0.00% 15.0 0 
>60 2 20.00% 20.0 4.00 
Total 10 Expected Value of 40/60 Spread 4.00 
(Lane and Lobo, A Simple Approach 3) 
This expected value was calculated using data from the last 
ten years only. As predicted, the resulting expected value is 
higher, which suggests a higher premium (3). Again, an increase 
in population density in the coastal regions and increased 
construction costs have resulted in higher catastrophic losses. 
Thus, when more recent historical data is used, expected losses 
are higher. 
The expected value method has another useful application. It 
can be used to compare the relative prices of different CAT 
spreads, either for the same loss period or across different loss 
periods. For example, the expected value of the 60/80 catastrophe 
spread is 1.48, while the 80/100 spread's expected value is 1.36. 
These figures suggest that the expected values of catastrophe 
spreads decline more rapidly at lower levels than at higher levels 
( 2 ) • 
This is just one suggestion for the pricing of catastrophe 
options. There are many others. For instance, a separate 
distribution could be modeled for each cause of losses. In other 
words, hurricanes, snowstorms, earthquakes, and other types of 
catastrophes would have their own distribution (Lane and Lobo, A 
Simple Approach 3). Another possibility is a model that somehow 
accounted for IBNR. Unfortunately, until a generally accepted 
method is found for pricing these options the confusion and 
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uncertainty will only serve to hinder this market's chances for 
success. 
One effect of this pricing confusion is that it makes it 
difficult for insurance companies to know if they are paying a 
reasonable price for this form of reinsurance. One way to get a 
better idea of the fairness of an option price is to study implied 
loss distributions. The idea behind implied loss distributions, 
or ILDs, is similar to that of implied volatility. Catastrophic 
losses are often assumed to follow some statistical distribution. 
The distribution is fitted to historical data and it is 0 ce again 
assumed that the trend will continue into the future. Like 
implied volatility, this process can be reversed by using market 
premiums to derive the best statistical distribution of losses 
(Lane and Finn 2). 
Since option pricing models assume that the price of the 
underlying asset is lognormally distributed, the price of a call 
option is the expected value of all outcomes in which the option 
finishes in-the-money. This is discounted to present value. Then 
Options Price = PV ~[(valuei)(probabilitYi)] 
where valuei is the ith price minus the strike price and the 
probabilitYi is the lognormally distributed probability of that 
outcome. However, this distribution is not appropriate for 
catastrophic losses because the probability of a catastrophe lS 
too small and the normal distribution does not have a long enough 
tail. With the proper parameters, a Gamma distribution has a long 
enough tail (3). Lane Financial used a proprietary algorit,hm to 
search the Gamma distributions and select the one that best fits 
the current market prices. The resulting implied loss distribution 
lS an explanation for those prices (4). 
Attachment III shows the ILDs for the third quarter Eastern 
catastrophes, whi.ch is where the most trading has taken place. An 
important observation to make is that there is a significant 
difference in the ILDs of the three years. The 1993 line reflects 
the fact that insurers believed that the probability of high 
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catastrophe losses were low compared to the probability of lower 
losses. In 1994, the market thought that the probability of large 
events was greater compared to 1993, while their perception of the 
probability of smaller events was lower than in 1993. One 
possible explanation for this belief is the occurrence of the 
Northridge Earthquake in January of 1994. Insurers became scared 
and therefore, demand went up and they were willing to pay more 
for coverage, and they did. 1995 prices settled in between the 
previous two years. The changes in these prices can also be seen 
in Table V, which gives the theoretical prices of 50 and 150 
calls, using rate-on-line (4). 
TABLE V: Theoretical Prices (ROL%) 
1993 1994 1995 
50 Call 11% 20% 15% 
150 Call 4% 11% 7% 
(Lane and Finn 4) 
Table V once again illustrates that changes in supply and demand, 
in the both the reins ranee market and at the Chicago Board of 
Trade, have a great effect on the prices. Insurers can also use 
theoretical ROLs to compare the prices of catastrophe options with 
traditional reinsurance. 
Insurers can also measure the value of options by comparing 
theoretical prices to the actual bid and ask prices. Table VI 
displays the theoretical prices with the bid and ask prices as of 
February 15, 1995. 
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TABLE VI: Actual VB. Theoretical Prices 
Eastern Cat.ast.ropbe Cont.ract.s 
Third Quart.er 1995 
Instrument Bid/Ask Theoretical Price 
Calls 
100 8.5/12.0 10.0 
150 4.0/5.5 3.5 
190 0.2/0.9 0.5 
Call Spreads 
35/55 6.2/7.5 7.0 
45/65 6.0/6.5 6.1 
50/70 5.3/5.5 5.7 
60/80 4.0/5.5 5.0 
140/160 1.5/2.0 1.9 
(Lane and Finn 7-8) 
According to Table VI, pricing is reasonable, with the 
exception of the 150 call, which is overpriced, and the 50/70 call 
spread, which is underpriced (8). 
PREDICTIONS FOR THE FUTURE 
At the present time, catastrophe options are not being 
utilized to their fullest potential. This is probably largely due 
to a fear of the unknown. In other words, "CBOT insurance options 
have not taken off yet because they just don't look like 
insurance" (Sclafane 6). Insurance companies are not risk-takers. 
On the contrary, they are well-known for their stable, 
conservative philosophies and thus, none of them want to be 
pioneers in this new market. However, if companies would just 
give catastrophe options a chance, they could be very successful. 
As stated earlier, the market is caught in a catch-22. No one 
wants to buy CAT options because no one else is buying CAT 
options, but if insurers would enter the market, others would 
follow and performance would improve. 
What can be done to increase trading? The answer is in the 
pricing. In fact, this problem has occurred before. Prior to 
1973, options were bought and sold over-the-counter and trading 
was "virtually non-existent" (Copeland 283). On April 26, 1973, 
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the Chicago Board of Options Exchange, or CBOE, introduced options 
for trading (240). At nearly the same time, Fischer Black and 
Myron Scholes introduced their pricing model. By the end of 1974, 
volume of the CBOE was larger than that of the American Stock 
Exchange, and today, options are co sidered an integral part of 
the stock market. In fact, the volume of options traded daily on 
the New York Stock Exchange is greater than that of physical 
stocks. Trading has expanded to include markets such as Tokyo, 
London, Paris, Singapore, and Geneva (Gibson 181). The 
publication of the Black-Scholes pricing model was most likely a 
major factor in the explosion in the volume of trading. A similar 
phenomena could occur for catastrophe options. 
In the end, as in all markets, supply and demand determine 
prices for futures, options, and insurance. The market sets the 
ultimate price and as Table V illustrated, it is setting a fair 
one for CAT options. Insurers simply need a model to assure 
themselves that they are paying a good price for their coverage. 
Once a standardized method of pricing is found, history could 
repeat itself and catastrophe insurance options would be a 
substantial addition to the capital market. 
Attachment I 
Synthetic History 
Simulated Settlement Values
 
for September Eastern Catastrophe Contract
 
Adjustmen factor for losses 
Loss Number 6% Constant 10% Constant 15% Constant CPI& 
Year Quarter of Events Growth Growth Growth Population GNP 
1949 3 1 1.80% 9.68% 79.04% 1.35% 3.12% 
1950 3 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
1951 3 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
1952 3 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
1953 3 1 0.18% 0.82% 5.49% 0.15% 0.28% 
1954 3 4 24.82% 109.03% 693.39% 20.97% 40.53% 
1955 3 2 4.50% 19.01 % 114.99% 4.00% 7.09% 
1956 3 1 0.53% 2.14% 12.33% 0.49% 0.84% 
1957 3 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
1958 3 1 0.63% 2.37% 12.34% 0.60% 1.06% 
1959 3 2 2.49% 8.97% 44.41% 2.42% 4.11% 
1960 3 1 10.22% 35.32% 166.42% 10.24% 17.22% 
1961 3 2 11.03% 36.61 % 164.10% 11.35% 18.95% 
1962 3 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
1963 3 1 0.47% 1.44% 5.83% 0.52% 0.80% 
1964 3 2 7.00% 20.61% 79.49% 7.95% 11.80% 
1965 3 1 42.86% 121.25% 444.89% 50.54% 70.85% 
1966 3 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
1967 3 3 6.22% 16.25% 53.95% 7.67% 10.02% 
1968 3 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
1969 3 2 10.92% 26.32% 79.08% 13.74% 16.77% 
1970 3 1 19.11% 44.26% 126.48% 23.80% 29.56% 
1971 3 5 1.55% 3.46% 9.40% 1.93% 2.35% 
1972 3 1 0.00% 0.01% 0.02% 0.00% 0.00% 
1973 3 3 0.45% 0.92% 2.27% 0.57% 0.62% 
1974 3 2 0.81% 1.60% 3.74% 1.00% 1.10% 
1975 3 3 5.72% 10.85% 24.16% 6.62% 7.56% 
1976 3 4 1.19% 2.17% 4.59% 1.36% 1.51% 
1977 3 5 3.14% 5.50% 11.08% 3.58% 3.74o/r 
1978 3 I, : 5 0.49% 0.83% 1.59% 0.55% 0.55% 
1979 3 7 33.58% 54.26% 98.87% 36.16% 35.85% 
1980 3 5 2.24% 3.47% 6.02% 2.22% 2.37% 
1981 3 3 0.37% 0.55% 0.91% 0.35% 0.37% 
1982 3 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
1983 3 3 19.41 % 26.74% 39.89% 17.81% 19.37% 
1984 3 1 0.96% 1.27% 1.80% 0.89% 0.92% 
1985 3 4 25.36% 32.24% 43.52% 23.89% 24.29% 
1986 3 2 0.40% 0.49% 0.63% 0.38% 0.39% 
1987 3 4 1.22% 1.43% 1.75% 1.21% 1.18% 
1988 3 5 1.78% 2.01% 2.33% 1.78% 1.69% 
1989 3 4 61.73% 66.87% 73.90% 62.13% 58.06% 
1990 3 1 0.19% 0.19% 0.20% 0.19% 0.18% 
1991 3 2 10.79% 10.79% 10.79% 10.79% 10.58% 
1992 3 5 178.27% 171.28% 162.92% 182.51 % 177.38% 
(Lane and Lobo r A Simple Approach 4) 
Attachment II 
Histograms of Simulated Loss Ratios
 
for September Eastern Catastrophe Futures 1949-1992
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Attachment III
 
Implied Loss Distributions
 
Third Quarter Eastern Contract
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(Lane and Finn 5) 
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